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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ALAN G. ROSS, a single man; LARRY R.
BROWN, a married man as to his sole and
separate property; MICHAEL R. MURPHY
and NANCY B. MURPHY, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

v.
TOMMY A. DORSEY and ERIN T. DORSEY,
husband and wife,
Defendants/Appellant,
and
The ESTATES OF F.M. HARKER and GLADYS
L. HARKER; BANK OF THE CASCADES, dba
FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK, an Oregon
corporation doing business in the State
of Idaho; BANNER BANK, a Washington
corporation doing business in the State
of Idaho; and any and all other
claimants in and to that common beach
area being approximately 20 feet wide
and 132.87 feet long and consisting of
all that property lying between the
shore of Priest Lake and the West
boundary of Lot 1 Steamboat Bay Lots
according to the Plat thereof as
recorded on February 21, 1966, in the
records of Bonner County, Idaho, Book 2
of Plats, Page 125, located in
Government Lot 5 Section 27, Township
60 North, Range 4 West, Boise Meridian,
Bonner County, Idaho,
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Bonner County Case No.
2009-904

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Defendants.

* * * * *
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner

* * * *
THE HONORABLE STEVE VERBY, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

* * * *
GARY A. FINNEY
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(Attorney for Dorsey Defendant - Appellant)

Edward J. Anson
Witherspoon Kelley
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(Attorney for Banner Bank)
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, CHTD.
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Respondents)
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REPLY STATEMENT OF THE CASE
COMES NOW, the Appellant, DORSEY, and files this REPLY
as additional argument in rebuttal to the Respondents'
Brief, as follows:
I .

THE FACTS.

ROSS, et al., I. Statement of the Case, page 1, first
paragraph, claim that DORSEY has not set forth a recitation
of facts, so they choose to restate the undisputed facts of
the case, as allowed by I.A.R. 35(b) (3).
First, I.A.R. 35(b) (3) does not allow ROSS, et al., to
"restate the undisputed facts of the case", as that rule
actually provides for a statement of the case to the extent
Respondent disagrees with the statement of the case set
forth in Appellant's Brief.

Obviously, ROSS, et al., agree

with DORSEY'S statement of the case as to the facts, because
they merely restated and repeated the exact same facts
already set forth by DORSEY.

ROSS, et al. in A PROCEDURAL

STATEMENT OF TITLE CASE, which is not procedure at all,
repeat facts that are:
1.

The Plat of Steamboat Bay contains the

statement of the Owner's (Harker) intent.

This was already

quoted by DORSEY, Appellant's Brief, page 8, second
paragraph, as the exact language of the Plat Owner's
Certification.
2.

The language of the Harker to Wright Deed

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) with the reservation in grantors,

-4-

Harker.

This Warranty Deed signed by Harker on 21 Feb 1966,

held in escrow on a contract for deed, and not recorded
until 12 years later in May 1978, was already quoted by
DORSEY.

(Appellant's Brief, pages 6 and 7).

Without any basis in the record, in fact or law, Ross,
et al., page 4, first paragraph, falsely state:
The District Judge found that Harkers reserved fee
title to themselves in the common beach and by the Deed
language privately dedicated an easement on the common beach
and road in favor of all eight (8) lots of Steamboat Bay
Lots (Tr. pp 317-328)

(underlining emphasis added).

ROSS,

et al., may have their own opinions, but not their own
facts.

In fact and law, District Judge Verby found and

concluded just the opposite of the foregoing underlined
quotation from Respondents' Brief.

First of all - the

citation to Tr. pp. 317-328 is to 11 pages, none of which is
as ROSS, et al., claim.

The actual finding and legal

conclusion of District Judge Verby is to the exact opposite,
starting at Tr. p. 320, 11. 24-25, that,
"Mr. Finney has argued and is correct in his
analysis as i t relates to the reservation "
Continued to Tr. p. 321, 11. 1-6
" ... By [Harker] reserving in the Deed to Wrights
this private beach, that doesn't convey to
anyone a fee simple interest. By doing so,
that doesn't by operation of law, convey
anything to the future lot owners.
That being
the lot owners of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8."
District Judge Verby then cited Davis v. Gowen, 83
Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403, for the proposition that in a
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conveyance, if any reservation is made in the property
conveyed, the part reserved remains in the grantors therein
and i t does not inhere (sic-inure) to the benefit of a
stranger to the instrument.

(Tr. p. 321, 11. 16-22).

District Judge Verby clearly told ROSS, et al.,
"***From Harkers to the Wrights, you as
plaintiffs did not receive anything by that
reservation. And when I say, "by anything", I
mean you received nothing ... " (Tr. p. 322, 11.
11-14)
In summary, Respondents' Brief, page 4, first
paragraph, is accurate that the District Judge found that
Harkers reserved fee title to themselves in a common beach,
but is patently in error in stating, "and by the Deed
language dedicated an easement on the common beach ... "
ROSS, et al., did not file a Cross-Appeal- they can not
now argue that District Judge Verby was in error that the
reservation gave them nothing, so they just ignore his
actual ruling and claim to the contrary of the District
Judge's findings and conclusions.
Again, Respondents' Brief, page 5, last paragraph and
continued on page 6, states directly contrary to the
District Judge's findings and conclusion, that ... "the
subsequent Harker - Wright Deed executed February 21, 1966
led the Trial Court to the conclusion that reserving
ownership dedicated the common beach in the Harker-Wright
Deed.

Respondents' authority is Tr. pp. 319, 11. 12-17".

DORSEY points out - there is no language as stated by ROSS,
et al. that the Harker-Wright Deed dedicated the common
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beach, nor is there any such finding in the District Judge's
ruling at Tr. p. 319, 11. 12-17, which actually only states
that it is a mixed question of finding of fact and
conclusions of law that it was the intent of Harker to
provide for roadway and beach access to all lot owners of
the subdivision by including the language in the owner's
certification, i.e. the Owner's Certification created the
dedication of an easement.
II.

DORSEY'S ANALYSIS OF ROSS, ET AL.'S III.
ARGUMENT.

Much of the ARGUMENT of ROSS, et al., does not dispute
what DORSEY set forth in their Appellant's Brief.
ROSS, et al., filed this action, entitled COMPLAINT FOR
QUIET TITLE, and they must rely or prevail on the strength
of their own title, which they alleged to be as common
owners (tenants in common) to a lakefront parcel of land.
ROSS, et al., never pled an "easement" on this parcel, not
in a written document, not in testimony, and not in their
counsel's closing argument to the District Court.

The word

"easement" appeared for the first time in the District Court
findings/conclusions at Tr. p. 324, 11. 20-22, i.e., stating
that when a common law dedication is accomplished, it has
the legal effect of creating an easement in favor of lot
purchasers.

The District Judge cited head-note principals

of the common law of private dedication from Sun Valley Land

and M2neral, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 798
(2003) .

(Tr. p. 324, 11. 13-14).

However, the Sun Valley

Land and M2nerals case supra, found no easement rights to
-7-

use common areas and no common law private dedication, and
this case is authority to deny any common law dedication by
Harker's Plat of Steamboat Bay Lots.

In the Owner's

Certification Harker stated their intention to plat Lot 1 as
extending to the waters of Priest Lake.

ROSS, et al.,

acknowledge the exact words of the Plat at the top of
Respondents' Brief, page 10, third paragraph, and that
DORSEY contends that the language of the Plat, Owner's
Certification caused Lot 1 to encompass all of the beach
front extending to the mean high water line of Priest Lake.
ROSS, et al., seem to think they can get around the Plat
itself and prevail because of their stated "inconvenient
fact" supposedly overlooked in DORSEY'S argument as to the
reservation in the Harker-Wright Deed.
page 10, fourth paragraph).

(Respondents' Brief,

The inconvenient fact to ROSS,

et al., is that the Harker-Wright Deed reservation in
Harker, did not give ROSS, et al. anything and i t gave them
nothing, according to District Judge Verby's ruling - from
which they filed no cross-appeal.

It needs to be

remembered, ROSS, et al.'s own expert witness, Surveyor Mr.
Bailey said,

"A.
In my professional opinion in conjunction
with the ownership certificate on the original
plat, the line would extend through that
northerly point on line monument to the
original high water, wherever that may be", and
when asked if it would be the same on the south
line of Lot 1, answered, "It would be".
(Tr.
p. 61, 11. 15-22)"
In Sun

Va~~ey

Land and

M2nera~,
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Inc. v. Hawkes, 138

Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 798 (2003), the Lot Owners sued, in a
quiet title action, for property rights based on a
subdivision plat, and its covenants, conditions, and
restrictions (CC&R's).

The Plat itself depicted 45 circular

1/4 acre lots, and open space.

The CC&R's indicated this

open space shown on the Plat would be designated as "Common
Area" and that this Common Area would be owned by a
homeowner's association for the common use and enjoyment of
the individual lot owners.

The Supreme Court held that this

did not create easement rights because common law private
dedication was not clearly and unequivocally intended.
III. IN QUIET TITLE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO PROVE THEIR TITLE, AND MAY NOT RELY ON
THE WEAKNESS OF DEFENDANT'S TITLE.
ROSS, et al., have no conveyance of title or ownership,
ever at all, for the real estate to which they sought quiet
title.

The standard of proof is:
"***Under Idaho case law the rule is that
the party seeking to quiet title against
another must succeed on the strength of
their own title, and not on the weakness
of that of his adversary."
Pincock v. Pocatello Gold & Cooper Mining Co., Inc.
100 Idaho 325 at 331 (1979)
(Re-affirmed in Rend v. Harvey
147 Idaho 364 (2009)

In the first instance, the glaring deficiency is the
absence of any title whatsoever in ROSS, et al.

The entire

chain of title and the deed conveyances are trial exhibits
(Defendants' Exhibits L, CC, DD).

After Harker had conveyed

Lots 1 and 2 to Wright, Harker conveyed the remaining
platted Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 to Battaglia and Moore.
-9-

There were intervening owners, but ultimately these Lots 3-8
were conveyed to Ross, et al.

None of the conveyances from

Harker, or any subsequent owner, ever conveyed any interest
in the disputed real estate for which ROSS, et al.
quiet title.

f

sought

The only conveyance of the real estate at

issue was the Warranty Deed, Wright to DORSEY (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2) which conveyed Lots 1 and 2 in Steamboat Bay
Lots, according to the Plat thereof (emphasis added).

The

Plat, Owner's Certification, clearly and unambiguously
stated the Owner's intention that Lot 1, as located on the
plat, shall include the lands lying between the sidelines
produced to the mean-high water line of Priest Lake.
According to the Plat (Defendant's Exhibit B)

Lot 1

included the real estate at issue, and i t was deeded
(conveyed) to DORSEY by Wright.
un~~iguously,

The Plat clearly and

plats Lot 1 as including the land all the way

to the water line of Priest Lake.
ROSS, et al., for the first time, which was never pled,
raised, or argued below, adds a footnote 2, page 14,
Respondents' Brief, stating that it is worth noting than
even the Owner's Certificate (sic) contains an ambiguity in
that it refers to sidelines "produced to the mean high water
line". Harker chose not to use the language "extended" to
the water line.

This claim of ambiguity in the word

"produced" can not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Without ever proving their title, except for the effect
of the Plat itself, which neither conveyed, nor dedicated,
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anything to ROSS, et al., or their predecessors, the
Respondents' Brief makes some bold statements attacking
DORSEY'S title.

Respondent's Brief, page 9, in the third

paragraph starting on that page, refers to DORSEY'S counsel
arguing that the reservation (emphasis added) language found
in the Warranty Deed (Wright to Dorsey) "subject to"
language is only a limitation on Wright's warranty of title
to DORSEY.

Actually, the Respondents' Brief is in error to

call this "subject to" language the reservation language, as
the reservation language was only in the Harker to Wright
deed. There is no reservation language found in the Warranty
Deed to DORSEY (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

Respondents' Brief

then states that ... "At no point does DORSEY'S counsel
explain this point or provide case law to support it."
Respondents' Brief overlooks pages 20-22 of Appellant's
Brief, case law Caps tar Radio qperating Co. v. Lawrence, 143
Idaho 704, 152 P.2d 581 (2007) that "subject to" language
merely excludes warranties of title, and "subject to"
language does not withhold title from DORSEY.
IV.

B. RESPONDENTS' RESTATED ISSUES ON APPEAL, PARAGRAPH 3, PAGE 18, DORSEY SUBMITS THAT THE
RESERVED FEE OWNERSHIP WAS NOT FOUND TO HAVE
CREATED AN EASEMENT FOR ALL EIGHT (8) LOTS.

Respondents' Brief, page 18, page 3, is one of their
Restated Issues, as follows:
"3. Did the Trial Court err in finding
that Harker reserved fee ownership in the
common beach area and thereby creating an
easement for the benefit of all eight (8)
lots?"
First, the Trial Court made no such finding.
-11-

Contrary

to Respondents' Brief is a misrepresentation of the Trial
Court's finding - because the finding was exactly contrary
to Respondents' claim that the Harker to Wright reservation
created an easement.

As has already been pointed out by

DORSEY, the Trial Court found and concluded that,
a)

Plaintiffs did not receive anything by the

Harker to Wright reservation (Tr. p. 322, 11. 11-13).
b)
nothing.
V.

More specifically - Plaintiffs received

(Tr. p. 332, 11. 13-14)
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT PONDEROSA HOMESITE LOT
OWNERS V. GARFIELD BAY RESORT, INC., 143 IDAHO
407, 146 P.3D 673 (2006) AND SADDLEHORN RANCH
LANDOWNERS, INC. V. DEYER, 146 IDAHO 747, 203 P.3D
377 (2008) ARE "VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL" TO THIS
ACTION IS DISPUTED BY DORSEY.

ROSS, et al., Respondents' Brief, page 16, submit that
Ponderosa HomeSite Lot Owners v. Garrield Bay Resort, Inc.,

146 P.3d 673 (2006) is virtually identical to the facts of
this instant case.

In Ponderosa Homesite, supra, the actual

facts were stated that the Plat itself shows an area marked
as "lake access", being an "L" shaped small piece of
lakeshore property, located between lots 3 and 4 within the
Plat of Ponderosa Homesite subdivision, which connected with
the public road and the larger portion abutting on Garfield
Bay on Lake Pend Oreille south of Lot 4.

The "lake access"

was identified on the Plat, without block or lot
designation, and without mention in the dedication.

The

plat dedication included:
"(t)hey do hereby dedicate to the public, for the use

-12-

of the public, for the use of the public as highways, the
roads shown upon this plat".

Neither the plat, nor any

contemporaneous deeds, declaration, nor papers indicate who
is to be the owner of the "lake access".

(This was recited

as coming from the first appeal, Ponderosa Home Site Lot

Owners v.

Gar£ie~d

798 (2003).

Bay Resort, Inc., 138 Idaho 543, 66 P.3d

The District Court had found the apparent

intent of placing the area marked "lake access" on the Plat
must have been as an inducement to lot buyers.

The Supreme

Court held that similarly to Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho
529, 585 P.2d 608 (1978) the legal effect of illustrating a
private road on a plat and dedicating i t is the creation of
an easement for lot purchasers.

The Monaco v. Bennion case,

99 Idaho 529, referenced to Smylie v.

Pearsa~l,

93 Idaho

188, 457 P.2d 427 (1969), concerned a parcel, not given a
designated lot number, which was located on the lake at the
terminus of a "drive-way" connected to a "road", and which
formed a natural boat launch and landing area at the
terminus of the driveway.

The trial court found the parcel

was no part of the platted lots, and was dedicated to the
public (emphasis added).

This amounted to a common law

dedication of public areas indicated
added)

~

the plat (emphasis

(Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 529, 533).

The legal effect was that the original owner and
platter, still owned the private roadway, but by dedicating
it had created an easement in favor of lot purchasers.
The Smylie case, supra, and the Monaco case, supra, are
-13-

significant distinguishable for the instant action in that,
1.

The Plats delineated the disputed area as

"driveway", "road", and was referred to by Bennion's counsel
as a road easement that appears on the Plat.
2.

The disputed area was no part of the platted lots.

(Monaco at 533) .
The instant action is to the contrary,
1.

the disputed area is not platted as "driveway",

"road", "common area", or "common beach", and
2.

The Owner's Certification on the Plat itself by

Harker declares the disputed area to be part ·of a platted
lot, i.e. Lot 1.
Respondents' Brief, second paragraph, page 16, defines
Dedication as essentially the setting aside of real property
for the use or ownership of others, citing Armand v.

qpportunity Management Co, Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 714, 117
P.3d 123, 128 (2005).

Armand, supra, involved a Plat of 17 lots, including
Lot 10 that was "Lake Frontage", and was three times the
size of all the other lots.

The platting owner, Smith, sold

several vacant lots, prior to finalizing the Plat, to the
Schafhausen Trust and the Warranty Deed specifically
provided that the Grantor agrees that the Lake Frontage
contained in Lot 10 of the proposed subdivision may be used
by the Grantee, and by all other owners of lots in the
proposed subdivision for access to the lake.

Smith also

presented an affidavit that he offered to dedicate Lot 10,
-14-

as part of his sale plans, by telling the purchasers that
Lot 10 would be a common lot providing lake access, boat
docks, and a swimming and picnic area.

Further, that he

intended Lot 10 as a corridor [between lot 9 and 11] for the
owners to access the Lake.

The lot purchaser also presented

an affidavit that he purchased from Smith relying on Lot 10
being a common area for recreational use and for lake
access.
On Appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the District
Court's grant of summary judgment saying there were genuine
issues of material fact as to whether a common law
dedication occurred.
Respondent's Brief, page 16, refers to the Trial
Court's citation to Saddlehorn Ranch Landowners, Inc. v.
Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677 (2008), which involved two
parcels being defined in the Plat as reserved for future
recreation use.

The Plat referred to these parcels as "R"

lots defined in the legend as "Reserved" , Lot R-1 being
labeled on the Plat as "Gravel Pit and Future Recreation
Lot" and Lot R-4 labeled as "Recreation Center".

Also, the

Covenants defined common areas as any area designated on any
current plat as common areas.

Saddlehorn, supra,

at 752

held that when the landowner sells by reference to a
recorded plat, ,,*** a dedication of public areas indicated
~

the plat is accomplished." (citing Monaco v. Bennion, 99

Idaho 529, 533 (1978) and

Smy~ie

191 (1969).
-15-

v.

Pearsa~~,

93 Idaho 188,

The key words are that the dedication of the public
areas must be indicated by the Plat, clear and unequivocal,
of the owner's intent to dedicate the land.

In the instant

action, there is no indication or dedication on the
Steamboat Bay Plat indicating a clear and unequivocal
dedication.

The Plat, Owner's Certification, is clear and

unequivocal, i.e. Lot 1 extends to Priest Lake, there is no
common beach indicated, designated, or platted.
Respondents' Brief, first paragraph 22, for the last of
many such claims unsupported, and in fact and law precisely
contrary to District Judge Verby's ruling, states,
"The Trial Court correctly stated the law
of Idaho thereby finding that Harkers
reserved title to themselves in the common
beach area and dedicated the common beach
area to the use of all eight (8) lots."
The foregoing is contrary to the District Judge Verby's
finding that Plaintiff did not receive anything, by that he
meant they received nothing, from the Harker/Wright deed
reservation language.
VI .

DORSEY'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

Concerning Dorsey's request for attorney fees,
Respondents are in error that DORSEY does not appear to
argue statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-203, and a
statute of frauds argument, Idaho Code § 9-503, and that
neither were asserted at the trial level.
ROSS, et al., makes the above entitled assertions in
the third beginning paragraph, page 23, of the Respondents'
Brief.

These assertions are contrary to the record.
-16-

For Defendants' DORSEY - Trial Memorandum, R. Vol. 1,
pp. 174-175, cites and argues Idaho Code, statutes of
limitations §5-207, §5-20B, and §5-210.

Further, DORSEY'S

counsel argued these statutes and theories in closing
argument.

Idaho Code §9-503 was argued in closing arguments

at Court Trial, p. 291, and the statute of limitations Idaho
Code §5-203 is specifically argued at Court Trial, p. 297.
In summary, Respondents' Brief claim that Idaho Code
§5-203 and Idaho Code §9-503 were "neither... asserted at the
trial level" is contrary to the trial record itself.
CONCLUSION
DORSEY by this brief in reply to the brief of the
Respondents concludes and requests relief, as follows:
1.

ROSS, et aI, brought this action for quiet title,

and they must prevail if at all on the strength of their own
title, not the weakness of DORSEY'S title.
on their own burden of proof.

They have failed

Judgment should be entered

Dismissing their Amended Complaint For Judgment of Quiet
Title.
2.

The Steamboat Bay Plat clearly and unequivocally,

in Harker's Owner's Certification, states the platting
owners' intention that Lot 1 included all land to the waters
of Priest Lake.
3.

Bailey, Plaintiffs' own expert witness surveyor,

agreed that Lot 1 was created by the plat such that Lot 1
land extend to the waters of Priest Lake.

There was no land

lying between Lot 1 and Priest Lake; therefore, Harkers
-17-

"reserved" no land existing at all.
4.

For argument purposes accepting Judge Verby's

finding the Plat was ambiguous as a matter of law, an
ambiguous Plat can not be a clear and unequivocal, common
law dedication.

The finding of a common law dedication of

an easement, was unpled, untried, unargued, and a surprise
appearing for the first time after closing argument in
District Judge Verby's ruling, which should be reversed as
not within the scope of the pleadings or the evidence, or
the trial, or arguments of any counsel.
5.

The so called private easement to ROSS, et aI, is

not based on Idaho law.
6.
5-205.

ROSS, et al., were barred by Idaho Code §5-203 and
Idaho Code §5-207 provides that Wright and then

Dorsey are deemed to have held the property adversely, and a
decree of quiet title should be entered in favor of Dorsey.
7.

Harker, by the time of this action and the trial,

owned no lots in Steamboat Bay Plat.

Their reservation in

themselves of a common beach for themselves as lot owners
subsequently failed.
8.

Dorsey is entitled to attorney fees and costs,

pursuant to Idaho Code §12-121, as requested pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(e) (1) and I.A.R. 41.

,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~
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7 T#
~ay

of November, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. nt~\..
I hereby certify that on this ~g day of November,
2012, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were
served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were
addressed to:
Edward J. Anson
Witherspoon Kelley
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(Attorney for Banner Bank)
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, CHTD.
113 S. Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents)
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